信息物理系統安全 Cybersecurity for Cyber-Physical Systems

林有立 博士 新科工程網絡安全首席技術官 March 2024





## What is Cyber-Physical System? 信息物理系統的定義

 The term "cyber-physical systems" was coined more than 15 years ago, but it is now entering the mainstream as digital transformation intensifies, and operational technology (OT) environments become increasingly interconnected with IT systems and Internet of Things (IoT) devices.

"信息物理系統"一詞是在15年前創造的,但隨著數字化轉型的加劇以及工業系統统 (OT) 環境與 IT系統和物聯網 (IoT) 設備的互連日益緊密,現在正成為主流。

Cyber-physical systems encompass OT assets and systems, along with a
proliferation of connected devices. As a result, when we think about protecting OT
environment, we need to start thinking of cyber-physical systems security more
holistically, because it better reflects the reality we operate within today, as our
physical world connects more deeply and broadly with our digital world.

信息物理系統包括 OT 資產和系統,以及大量連接的設備。因此,當我們考慮保護 OT 環境時,我們需要開始更全面地考慮網絡物理系統安全,因為它更好地反映了 我們當今運營的現實,因為我們的物理世界與我們的數碼世界聯繫得更深入、更廣



#### OPERATIONAL TECHNOLOGY CYBERSECURITY 工業控制系統安全



Apr: Ukraine thwarts Russia's attack

8月:希腊天然气运营商遭到攻击

4月:烏克蘭挫敗了俄羅斯對電網的攻擊

8月:英国供水商遭到攻击

2月:白俄羅斯鐵路襲擊

on power grid

Feb: Belarus Rail attack

### Increasing Cyber Threats - Real & Imminent 日益嚴重的網絡威脅 OT System 工業控制系統



one-fifth power supply

烏克蘭基輔五分之一供電

destination in Kiev.

地点停電約1小時

Ukraine

connected hacking group,

Ukraine with a malware

attack

targeted a chlorine plant in

APT28 是一個與俄羅斯軍事情

報機構 (GRU) 有關聯的黑客組

織,針對烏克蘭的一家氯氣廠 發起了惡意軟件攻擊

U.S. Natural Gas Facility

• 以色列污水處理廠

• 美國天然氣設施

• 本田生產設施

Honda Manufacturing Facilities

(USA, UK, Japan & Turkey)



including **EU ones** 


的信息洩露

美國/加拿大航空防務和能

源公司(包括歐盟公司)

National Level 國家網絡安全戰略 – Cyber Security Agency (CSA) has formulated the cybersecurity strategy and is coordinating across the 11 critical sectors in national

cyber defence





**FOUNDATIONAL ENABLERS** 

#### **CSA Guidelines**

- Feb 2018: CSA Cybersecurity Act, 網絡安全法案
- Oct 2019: OT Cybersecurity Masterplan (latest), 工控系統網絡安全總體規劃
- Dec 2019: OT Cybersecurity Code of Practice Version 1.0, 實務守則 1.0
- July 2022: OT Cybersecurity Code of Practice Version 2.0.實務守則 2.0

#### Source:

**STRATEGIC** 

**PILLARS** 

https://www.csa.gov.sg/News/Publication s/singapore-cybersecurity-strategy-2021

#### OPERATIONAL TECHNOLOGY CYBERSECURITY 工業控制系統安全



## **Securing Critical Information Infrastructures**

#### 保護關鍵基礎設施





邊境檢查站 Police 警務 Fire & Rescue消防與救援



Cargo Terminal 貨運站



Port Terminals 港口碼頭 Bunker 掩體



Data Centre 數據中心 Telco 電訊公司



Railway 鐵路 Traffic Lights 交通管理





Water Treatment Plant 污水處理廠 Barrage & Dam 攔河壩



Power Plant 發電廠 Substation 變電站 Gas Work 氣體工作



Stock Exchange 股票交易 Central Bank & Banks 銀行



Broadcasting Station電台



## OT Cybersecurity Code of Practice Version 2.0 實務守則 2.0

4 July 2022 Issuance of OT Cybersecurity Code of Practice Version 2.0 實務守則 2.0登行日

#### Main Differences 主要區別

- One of the Board of Director must be Cybersecurity trained 其中一名董事會成員必須接受過網絡安全培訓
- Access Control, implement solution with auto logout after detection of inactivity 接入控制, 自動退出程序
- Implement Database Security and monitoring on OT System 在工控網絡系統上實施數據庫安全和監控
- Implement Domain Name System Security Extension (DNSSEC) 實施域名系統安全擴展管理
- Isolate affected network segments of the CII in the event of a cybersecurity incident 在發生網絡安全事件時隔離關鍵信息通信基礎設施受影響的網段
- ◆ Threat Hunting capability 威脅掃描和響應能力
- ◆ Cyber Threat Intelligence and Information Sharing 威脅情報、數據和信息共享
- Annual Cybersecurity Exercise 年度網絡安全演習
- Compulsory Cybersecurity Training and Skills development 人員進行網絡安全教育、技術培訓和技能考核



#### **Challenges and Pain Points in OT Environment**



工控系統面臨的挑戰和痛點



VAPT are manual, tedious and based on Interview

VAPT 是人工作業 , 繁雜並 且基於面試



Unable to map out threats to assets effectively 無法有效描繪工控系統資產面臨的威脅



Information gap between ICS (OT) and Cybersecurity staff

ICS (OT) 與網路安全人員之間的資訊差距



Threat intel from various sectors and domains not relevant to sector & region 來自與部門和地區無關的各個

來自與部門和地區無關的各個部門和領域的威脅情報




Determining and aligning business processes 確定和調整業務流程



Adhering to IEC62443 Standards and Compliance 國際標準和合規性



Adhering to CSA
Cybersecurity Code of Practice
2.0 Compliance
遵守網絡安全局網絡安全行






### OT Security Solution Coverage 解決方案 Leveraging the Purdue model Purdue 模式的應用



#### **LEVELS**



4級: 包括企業資源規劃 (ERP) 軟件、 數據庫、電子郵件服務器和其他管理 製造運營物流並提供通信和數據存儲 的系統。該網絡從 ICS 系統收集數據 用於業務決策。

3級:支持生產工作流程的管理。示例 包括批次管理、製造運營管理/製造執 行系統 (MOMS/MES) 和數據歷史記 錄。

2級:是控制系統內整個過程的設備。 例如,人機界面 (HMA) 和 SCADA 軟件使人能夠監控和管理流程。

1級:由監控級別 0 的設備並向其發送 指令的系統組成。示例包括可編程邏 輯控制器 (PLC)、遠程終端單元 (RTU) 和智能電子設備 (IED)。

O級:包括物理組件。這包括電機、泵、傳感器、閥門等



# OT Security Solution Coverage, 解決方案 IT/OT Integration IT/OT 整合



#### **LEVELS**







# **Use Case for Railway Transport**

鐵路方案



## **Cyber Threat Landscape of Train Operators**

鐵路運營商的網絡威脅態勢



The complexity, dynamics and size of rail networks create an environment that is difficult to monitor effectively; moreover, increasing rail connectivity leaves them extremely vulnerable

鐵路網絡的複雜性、動態性和規模創造了一個環境難以有效監控;此外,增加鐵路連通性使系

統極度脆弱

- ★ Cybersecurity breaches may lead to service disruptions, data breaches, derailments, network outages, and more 網絡安全漏洞可能導致服務中斷、數據洩露、脫軌、網絡中斷等
- ★ Rail companies face legal liability, financial loss, injury, and reputational harm 鐵路公司面臨法律責任、財務損失、傷 害和聲譽損害





## Facing a wide attack surface

## **ST Engineering**

## 面對廣泛的攻擊面

- 信令通訊 Signalling Communication 用於控製鐵路交通移動的系統 System that control the movement of railway traffic.
- 無線通信 Wireless Communication 遠程控制和更新的系統 Systems that are controlled and updated remotely.
- 維修渠道 Maintenance Channels 使用不安全的硬件、軟件和與關鍵/SIL4 環境的連接 Use of unsafe hardware, software and connections to the critical/SIL4 environment.
- 供應鏈 Supply Chain 連接到基礎設施以進行更新和組件安裝 Connection to the infrastructure for update and component installation.
- 鐵路車輛 Rolling Stock 火車上的扁平網絡拓撲和薄弱的物理安全性 Flat network topology on trains and weak physical security.

# **Cybersecurity Operations for Railway Transport** in Singapore

**ST** Engineering

新加坡鐵路運輸網絡安全運營




















#### **Railway System Potential Intrusion Points**

地鐵系統潛在的入侵點






#### **Railway System Potential Intrusion Points**

地鐵系統潛在的入侵點






#### **Railway System Potential Intrusion Points**

地鐵系統潛在的入侵點








### **OT Solutioning Based on Purdue Model**


#### 基於普渡模型的OT解決方案







# Elevating to next level 提升到一個新的水平 From Reactive to Proactive Approach 從被動到主動



CIARA: Industrial Risk Assessment & Management Platform (Proactive Strategy 主動策略)

#### 持續的工業風險評估平台

智能探針數據



Automatically obtain all data, generates report, identifies all threat intel 自動收集數據,生成報告,確認所有威脅情報



Fully-automated, data-driven vulnerability assessment engine 完全自動化落點評估

## iSID / 3 d party IDS DIGITAL IMAGE OF SuC:

System Behavior Vulnerabilies

Assets & business processes
\*Offline mode available via PCAP
and Excel

#### THREAT INTELLIGENCE

ATTACKER INFO: 威脅信息

Opportunity Capabilities



#### 公司給的具體材料


COMPANY-SPECIFIC INFO:

Installed protections Region & sector

Criticality of specific Assets



## Solution Workflow 解決方案工作流程





Simulates hundreds of commonly used security controls 模擬數百個常用的的安全控制



Utilises variety of sources, modelling network vulnerabilities, defences and possible attacks利用各種來源,建模網絡安全漏洞,網絡防禦,可能的網絡攻擊





### **Value Proposition of Continuous OT-Risk Assessment**

## 持續 OT 風險評估的價值主張



Automate and simulate top attack scenarios

24hrs 漏洞並模擬可能的攻擊場景



Map out assets based on region and sector

基於地區和部門



Close the gap between ICS (OT) vulnerabilities and Cybersecurity Staff

彌補OT資安漏洞与資安 人員之間的差距



Filtering of threat intel based on sector and region

針對性威脅情報



Determine and align business processes

協調商業流程以達到企 業的目標



IEC62443 Compliance 確保IEC62443合規性



CCoP v2.0 Compliance

可根據您的環境進行調節, 實現 CCoP v2.0 合規性 (新加坡)





Staying ahead on Cybersecurity 在網絡安全方面保持領先

As IT Cybersecurity becomes mature,
OT network offers an easy target for cybercriminals.

隨著 IT 網絡安全趨向成熟, OT 網絡將會是網絡罪犯的下一個簡單目標



